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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic evaluations of alternative electric generating technologies typically rely on 
comparisons between their expected life-cycle production costs per unit of electricity supplied.  
The standard life-cycle cost metric utilized is the “levelized cost” per MWh supplied.  This paper 
demonstrates that this metric is inappropriate for comparing intermittent generating technologies 
like wind and solar with dispatchable generating technologies like nuclear, gas combined cycle, 
and coal.  Levelized cost comparisons are a misleading metric for comparing intermittent and 
dispatchable generating technologies because they fail to take into account differences in the 
production profiles of intermittent and dispatchable generating technologies and the associated 
large variations in the market value of the electricity they supply.  Levelized cost comparisons 
overvalue intermittent generating technologies compared to dispatchable base load generating 
technologies. They also overvalue wind generating technologies compared to solar generating 
technologies. Integrating differences in production profiles, the associated variations in the 
market value of the electricity supplied, and life-cycle costs associated with different generating 
technologies is necessary to provide meaningful comparisons between them.  This market-based 
framework also has implications for the appropriate design of procurement auctions created to 
implement renewable energy procurement mandates, the efficient structure of production tax 
credits for renewable energy, and the evaluation of the additional costs of integrating intermittent 
generation into electric power networks.  
 
JEL:  L51, L94  
                                                 
1 I am grateful to John Parsons and Denny Ellerman for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The views 
expressed here are my own and do not represent the views of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, MIT, or any other 
organization with which I am affiliated. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 This paper makes a very simple point regarding the proper methods for comparing the 
economic value of intermittent generating technologies (e.g. wind and solar) with the economic 
value of traditional dispatchable generating technologies (e.g. CCGT, coal, nuclear).  I show that 
the prevailing approach that relies on comparisons of the “levelized cost” per MWh supplied by 
different generating technologies, or any other measure of total life-cycle production costs per 
MWh supplied, is seriously flawed.  It is flawed because it effectively treats all MWhs supplied 
as a homogeneous product governed by the law of one price.  Specifically, traditional levelized 
cost comparisons fail to take account of the fact that the value (wholesale market price) of 
electricity supplied varies widely over the course of a typical year.  The difference between the 
high and the low hourly prices over the course of a typical year, including capacity payments for 
generating capacity available to supply power during critical peak hours, can be up to four orders 
of magnitude (Joskow 2008).  We observe such a large variation in wholesale electricity prices 
because the demand for electricity varies widely over the hours of the year, electricity cannot be 
stored economically for most uses, and electricity demand and supply must be balanced 
continuously to maintain the reliability of the network. Wholesale electricity prices reach 
                                                 
2 I am grateful to John Parsons and Denny Ellerman for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The views 
expressed here are my own and do not represent the views of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, MIT, or any other 
organization with which I am affiliated. 
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extremely high levels for a relatively small number of hours each year (see Figure 1) and 
generating units that are not able to supply electricity to balance supply and demand at those 
times are (or should be) at an economic disadvantage. It is important to take wholesale market 
price variations into account because the hourly output profiles, and the associated market value 
of electricity supplied, of intermittent generating technologies and competing dispatchable 
generating technologies can be very different.  Moreover, different intermittent generating 
technologies (e.g. wind vs. solar) also can have very different hourly production and market 
value profiles, and indeed, specific intermittent generating units using the same technology (e.g. 
wind) may have very different production profiles depending on where they are located.  
I use a simple set of numerical examples that are representative of actual variations in 
production and market value profiles to show that intermittent and dispatchable generating 
technologies with identical levelized total costs per MWh supplied can have very different 
economic values due to differences in the economic value of the electricity they produce.  I will 
also argue that the failure of life-cycle cost comparisons between intermittent and dispatchable 
generating technologies to yield meaningful comparisons of economic value does not plague 
comparisons between different dispatchable “base load” generating technologies for which 
levelized cost comparisons were originally developed and applied.  This is the case because the 
economic value of the output produced by different dispatchable base load generating 
technologies is likely to be the same because their output profiles are likely to be the same.  The 
extension and use of levelized cost comparisons to intermittent generation has been a mistake 
and tends to implicitly overvalue intermittent generating technologies compared to dispatchable 
alternatives.3  This problem is easily remedied by integrating generation output profiles for each 
                                                 
3 Exactly the same mistake is associated with “stacking” of  levelized cost calculations from lowest to highest to 
create “supply curves” for reducing CO2 emissions by increasing the penetration low-carbon electricity generation 
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technology with the associated expected market value that will be supplied by each technology 
along with their respective lifecycle productions costs. 
 Most of the current work on intermittent generating technologies, especially wind, has 
focused on the short-term network operating challenges and associated costs created by rapid 
swings in output, wide variations in output from one day to the next, and the difficulties of 
controlling output consistent with balancing supply and demand efficiently and meeting network 
reliability criteria, in the context of expected large scale entry of wind and/or solar generating 
capacity.  That work assumes that large amounts of intermittent generating capacity will seek to 
be interconnected to transmission (or distribution) networks due to public policies aimed at 
promoting the rapid increase of intermittent renewable electricity supplies. It then examines the 
operational challenges and additional costs that adding large quantities of intermittent renewable 
generation to the network entails. This work is reasonably well advanced, though more needs to 
be done.   
This paper focuses on a more basic set of questions.  How do we properly measure the 
economic value of additional investments in intermittent generating technologies compared to 
dispatchable generating technologies?  Among other things, proper methods to answer this 
question are necessary: (a) to properly evaluate the costs and benefits of subsidies and mandates 
aimed at promoting certain intermittent generating technologies and (b) to properly measure the 
costs per unit of CO2 avoided by policies that favor intermittent generating technologies like 
wind and solar, making it possible transparently to compare the cost of reducing CO2 emissions 
using renewable energy subsidies and mandates with the cost of reducing CO2 emissions in other 
ways (e.g. energy efficiency, investments in nuclear power).  The proposed “market valuation” 
                                                                                                                                                             
technologies, including nuclear and carbon capture and sequestration, along with end-use electricity efficiency 
improvements. 
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enhancement to levelized cost comparisons that I will propose also provides a consistent 
framework for evaluating the short run technical and economic issues associated with integrating 
large amounts of intermittent generating technology into electric power networks since the 
resolution of these issues must take into account the output profiles of intermittent generating 
technologies as well.  I do not opine here on whether the policies for promoting renewable 
generating technologies are good or bad, but focus on the appropriate methods for evaluating 
their costs and benefits. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 The federal government and many states have adopted policies to promote the 
development of various renewable energy technologies for generating electricity.  These policies 
include tax subsidies, direct subsidies, loan guarantees, marketable renewable energy credits, 
renewable energy purchase mandates imposed on distribution utilities to purchase a specified 
fraction of the electricity they sell to retail consumers from qualifying renewable electricity 
generation technologies, and long-term contracting requirements for renewable electricity 
suppliers that are not applicable to non-renewable generation sources.4 The primary renewable 
generating technologies of interest to utilities are wind generation and various solar electric 
generating technologies and I will focus on those technologies here.  Other technologies that may 
                                                 
4 The primary federal incentive is a 10-year  2.1 cent/kWh production tax credit (adjusted annually by the rate of 
inflation)  for each kWh of electricity supplied by a qualifying renewable energy plant.  (For wind generators that go 
into service in 2009 and 2010 an alternative subsidy framework is available.)  About 30 states have  adopted 
“renewable energy portfolio standards” that require electric distribution utilities to purchase specified fractions of 
the generation they require to serve retail consumers (e.g. 20%) by a certain date, regardless of the associated prices 
they must pay.  If the mandates are binding they must have the effect of increasing the price utilities would 
otherwise pay for wholesale electricity supplies.  The differences between the market price and the higher price paid 
for renewable electricity generation passed through to retail consumers either in regulated bundled retail prices or in 
regulated distribution charges in states that have adopted competitive retail models. Individual states have adopted a 
number of other financial incentives to encourage use of renewable electricity sources either by utilities or by end-
use consumers. 
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satisfy renewable electricity criteria include geothermal, small-scale hydro, biomass, methane 
from waste dumps, tidal power, etc.  The primary motivation for these policies is to facilitate the 
development of no or low carbon electricity generation technologies in addition to or in lieu of 
placing a price on CO2 emissions and/or, as now seems most likely, administrative regulation of 
CO2 emissions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
 There has been a great deal of discussion and analysis of the technical challenges that 
must be confronted effectively to integrate large quantities of intermittent renewable energy 
technologies --- wind and solar in particular --- into electric power networks (e.g. USDOE (pp. 
62-67), NERC, ERCOT, NYISO).  In a number of cases the technical analyses have been 
accompanied by estimates of the additional costs of integrating large quantities of one or more 
intermittent generating technologies into electric power networks consistent with meeting 
reliability criteria (e.g. USDOE (pp. 62-67), ERCOT, NYISO).5   The technical challenges, and 
the associated costs, arise because of the production characteristics of wind, solar, and some 
other renewable generating technologies.  Most conventional (fossil fueled and nuclear) 
generating technologies are “dispatchable.”  This means that they can be controlled by the 
system operator and can be turned on and off based primarily on their economic attractiveness at 
every point in time both to supply energy and to supply network reliability services (e.g. 
frequency regulation, spinning reserves). Conventional dispatchable generators are typically 
scheduled by the system operator to meet demand by dispatching the generators with the lowest 
marginal generation cost first and then moving up the “dispatch curve,” calling on generators 
with higher marginal costs until demand for energy is satisfied in real time.  To keep things 
simple, and ignoring market power considerations, conventional generators are typically 
                                                 
5 The studies are of varying quality and comprehensiveness and the estimated integration costs for wind vary by 
roughly a factor of, 5 with $10/MWh of wind generation being the highest incremental integration cost reported so 
far. 
7 
 
 
dispatched when the wholesale market price for power exceeds their short-run marginal cost of 
generation.  The dispatchability of conventional generators also allows them to be scheduled well 
in advance of real time and are available to be called by system operators to supply network 
reliability services such as frequency regulation, spinning reserves, and other backup-reserves.  
These choices reflect both economic considerations (e.g. generators providing spinning reserves 
will typically have higher marginal generation costs than those dispatched to supply energy) and 
physical characteristics (e.g. ramp rates and location).  
 Wind, solar and other renewable generating technologies supply electricity 
“intermittently” and are not dispatchable in the traditional sense.  Electricity produced by these 
technologies is driven by wind speed, wind direction, cloud cover, haze, and other weather 
characteristics.  As a result, they cannot be controlled or economically dispatched by system 
operators based on traditional economic criteria. The output of intermittent generating units can 
vary widely from day to day, hour to hour or minute to minute, depending on the technology and 
variations in attributes of the renewable resource that drives the generation of electricity at a 
point in time at a particular location.  Rather than controlling how much and when an 
intermittent generator is dispatched, system operators must respond to what comes at them by 
calling on generators that are dispatchable to maintain network frequency and other grid 
reliability parameters.6 NERC and a number of system operators have studied the technical 
issues associated with integrating large amounts of wind and solar capacity into an electric power 
network.  The most important technical issues and some associated analysis of the costs of 
maintaining network reliability standards with large quantities of renewable energy capacity 
                                                 
6 System operators may order intermittent generators to reduce output due to transmission constraints or other 
network reliability constraints.   
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connected to the grid are summarized very clearly in recent studies and reports (e.g. NERC, 
USDOE, ERCOT and NYISO). 
 These studies take as given that there will be a large increase in the quantity of 
intermittent renewable energy that will be supplied in the years to come and proceed to analyze 
the implications for network operating protocols and the associated costs of balancing supply and 
demand in real time and meeting network reliability criteria.  These studies do not address the 
more basic question of whether the diffusion of these intermittent renewable technologies is 
economical compared to conventional dispatchable alternatives, or if they are not, exactly how 
costly they are compared to conventional dispatchable alternatives?   
Proponents of renewable electricity generation often argue that one or another renewable 
technology is now or soon will be “competitive” with conventional generating technologies (or 
that they would be competitive if we took the value of CO2 reductions into account).  Of course 
if these technologies were really less costly than conventional alternatives then there would be no 
need for subsidies and mandates. Recently announced contract prices for off-shore wind 
generation in New England of 20+ cents/kWh (escalating at 3.5% per year) suggest that wind 
energy at these locations is more than three times the wholesale market price for electricity at 
these locations in 2009.7,8 This price is not close to being competitive with conventional 
dispatchable generation and is a costly way to reduce CO2 emissions. If wind is displacing 
                                                 
7 SNL Energy Electric Utility Report, August 16,2010, page 46, page 22.  These reported prices are much higher 
than the average prices paid for wind generation reported elsewhere in the U.S.  See USDOE, page 41. 
8 The “all in” average wholesale market price in New England was about 8 cents /KWh in 2007, 10 cents/KWh in 
2008, and 6 cents/KWh in 2009.  This includes capacity payments and ancillary service charges. 2009 Annual 
Markets Report, ISO New England, May 18, 2010, page 22. http://www.iso-
ne.com/markets/mktmonmit/rpts/other/amr09_final_051810.pdf  
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CCGT generation in New England at an incremental cost compared to a conventional alternative 
of say, 12 cents/KWh, then the implied price of CO2 is about $300/ton.9  
On the other hand, the Energy Information Administration (EIA, p. 67) recently forecast 
that the “levelized cost” of wind generation would be lower than the “levelized cost” of coal and 
nuclear by 2020 and lower than the “levelized cost” of natural gas combined cycle, nuclear and 
coal by 2035.10  The Wall Street Journal recently reported results (attributed to Goldman Sachs) 
for levelized cost estimates for a wider range of electricity generating technologies. See Figure 8. 
Based on the levelized cost values reported there, wind is very competitive with most 
conventional alternatives, but solar has significantly higher levelized costs (Demming).11  
Similar “levelized cost” calculations appear elsewhere in the literature for wind, various solar 
technologies and other renewable electricity technologies (e.g. Cory and Schwabe, SunPower).  
The “levelized cost” of a supplying electricity using a particular generating technology  is 
a measure of the real total (capital plus operating cost) life-cycle costs per MWh supplied using 
that generating technology.  It is evident from the literature comparing the economics of 
intermittent generation with conventional dispatchable generation that the “levelized cost” per 
MWh supplied of alternatives is the most widely used comparative metric.  The National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conveniently provides a simple on-line program that 
allows one to calculate the levelized cost of any electricity generating technology using whatever 
                                                 
9 Studies of the integration of large scale wind generation in Texas and New England indicate that wind generation 
will largely displace natural gas fueled generation rather than coal fueled generation. (See ERCOT and NYISO) The 
CO2 mitigation benefits are also surprisingly small in New York.  Going from 1250 Mw to 8000 Mw by 2018 results 
in a reduction of only 8.5% in CO2 emissions in the electricity sector compared to the low-wind entry case.  In New 
York, the electricity sector accounts for about 25% of total state CO2 emissions, so the net effect of increasing wind 
generation by a factor of 7 is a 2% reduction in state CO2 emissions from what they would otherwise be.  See 
NYISO.  
10 It is not clear from the discussion in the EIA report whether the numbers for wind include the production tax 
credit and other subsidies. 
11 One of the comparison technologies is natural gas peaking turbines.  As a will discuss comparisons between an 
intermittent technology and a dispatchable technology that is built specifically to very high peak period demand 
during a small number of hours in the year is not a meaningful comparison since intermittent generation cannot be 
relied upon to be available to be dispatched to meet high peak period demand during the same critical demand hours. 
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set of assumptions one chooses about capital costs, operating costs, fuel costs, capacity factors, 
etc., so that their respective levelized costs can be compared.12  Moreover, competitive 
procurement programs run by utilities to meet renewable electricity purchase mandates 
sometimes implicitly make choices based on what is effectively a portfolio of projects that are 
offered at the “least cost” per MWh supplied over the life of the purchased power contract --- 
effectively choosing projects with the lowest levelized cost per MWh supplied.   
 In the rest of this paper I will show that conventional “levelized cost” calculations that 
have been used for decades in the electric power industry to compare conventional dispatchable 
generating technologies with one another are not particularly useful for comparing the economic 
attractiveness of technologies such as wind and solar with conventional dispatchable generating 
technologies such as nuclear, coal, and CCGT. Comparisons of the average annual price paid for 
intermittent generation with the overall average annual wholesale market price for electricity are 
flawed for similar reasons. Nor will competitive procurement programs that choose renewable 
generating projects based on the “least cost per MWh supplied” over the life of a long-term 
contract produce an efficient portfolio of renewable generating units.  
 The primary reasons that levelized cost comparisons between intermittent and 
dispatchable generating technologies are not meaningful are (a) the value or wholesale price of 
electricity varies widely throughout the day, month and year --- by four orders of magnitude if 
capacity prices are factored in and (b) intermittent generating technologies have very different 
production profiles from the production profiles of conventional dispatchable generating 
technologies.  A dispatchable generator with very low marginal generation costs (e.g. nuclear) 
will supply energy during all hours when it is available.  If a wind generator were dispatchable it 
would run all of the time when it is not out for maintenance since its marginal generation cost is 
                                                 
12 http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_loec.html  (accessed on September 6, 2010) 
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almost zero.13  But since its output depends on the speed and direction of the wind, its production 
is limited both as to time and quantity despite the fact that its marginal generating costs are 
effectively zero. As a result, the market value of the electricity supplied by intermittent 
generating technologies can vary widely depending when the electricity is produced and the 
production profile of intermittent generating technologies do not follow standard economic 
dispatch patterns.  
 These output and electricity price variations are not captured by traditional “levelized 
cost” calculations or traditional “least cost/MWh” competitive procurement mechanisms, even 
those that adjust for differences in utilization (capacity) factors between intermittent and 
dispatchable generating technologies.  As a will show, an intermittent generating technology and 
a dispatchable generating technology may have the same levelized cost while simultaneously 
having very different net economic values and profitability (absent subsidies, purchase mandates, 
contracts that do not differentiate the prices paid by the time the electricity is supplied, etc.). 
Choosing between offers to supply wind or solar energy by choosing the suppliers with the 
lowest levelized cost/MWh bids is likely to fail to lead to the selection of the highest value 
generating offers and increase the burden placed on consumers who are forced to pay for the 
above market costs of the associated power supply contracts.  Such a bidding framework is also 
likely to distort the kinds of projects that developers of intermittent technologies seek to bring 
forward. In particular, other things equal, it will undervalue solar (electricity produced during the 
day when prices are relatively high) and overvalue wind (whose production is more heavily 
weighted to off-peak periods in many locations when prices are low). 
                                                 
13 Transmission and other network constraints may lead to curtailments of the most economical dispatchable 
generating units as well as intermittent generating units. 
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   I suggest that levelized cost comparisons be replaced by a market-based or “power 
system” framework for evaluating the economics of all generating technologies. This is 
essentially the same as the approach an investor in unregulated generating units that must sell 
power into the wholesale market would take to evaluating investment alternatives.   
 
TRADITIONAL “LEVELIZED COST” COMPARISONS 
 For decades electric utilities have evaluated the economic choice between alternative 
generating technologies by comparing their expected “levelized cost” per MWh to be supplied 
over the life of each of the alternative generating technologies under consideration.  As I will 
discuss presently, the “levelized cost” is essentially the expected real total cost (capital plus 
operating costs) per MWh produced over the generating unit’s expected life.   The generating 
technology with the lowest expected levelized cost per unit of electricity supplied was then 
supposed to be chosen as the technology in which the utility would invest to meet a specified 
expected incremental demand for electricity.   
 The use of levelized cost comparisons emerged during the period when electric 
generating plants were subject to cost-of-service regulation. Its development and use reflected a 
need for a fairly simple “rule of thumb” metric acceptable to regulators that would allow 
regulated firms to make and defend choices between long-lived generating technologies with 
different construction costs, different life-cycle expected operating and maintenance costs and 
different expected utilization patterns.  Regulators also specified accounting rules that defined 
how capital costs and operating costs of generating plants subject to cost of service regulation 
would be recovered from consumers over time (Joskow 2007).  Evaluations of the costs of 
alternative generating technologies had to reflect the way in which the regulatory process would 
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transform the capital and operating costs into regulated consumer prices.  In the case of capital 
costs, these accounting rules defined depreciations rates, the computation of the rate base upon 
which a return on investment would be calculated, the utility’s cost of capital, the treatment of 
income taxes, etc. By applying these accounting rules to assumptions about construction and 
other capital costs, an expected stream of future “revenue requirements” associated with the 
return of and on the investment in a generating unit could be calculated.  Expected future 
operating and maintenance costs would then be added to the stream of future capital charges and 
the total life-cycle “revenue requirements” associated with the plant calculated.   
 Since alternative technologies had different expected construction, life-cycle operating 
costs and utilization (capacity) factors, their respective time streams of future revenue 
requirements differed as well.   Accordingly, these streams of future capital and operating costs 
were discounted back to the present time to give the present discounted value of future (nominal) 
revenue requirements or regulated cash flows.  To account for inflation, assumptions about 
general inflation that had (implicitly) been built into this calculation were “unbundled” and a 
constant real annual levelized cost yielding the same present value would be calculated for each 
technology in order to compare them on a common basis.  This real levelized annual capital and 
operating cost number would then be divided by the expected annual output of the generating 
plant over its expected life and a real levelized cost per MWh expected to be supplied for each 
technology derived.  The technology with the lowest expected levelized cost per unit of output to 
meet a specified increment in demand was then to be the investment choice made by the 
regulated firm. 
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 An example of this approach can be found in Joskow and Parsons (2009).14  They 
compare the real levelized cost per MWh for three base load generating technologies: nuclear, 
pulverized coal and natural gas combined cycle.  Base load technologies are dispatched during a 
large fraction of the hours of the year, and are scheduled to be “off line” for maintenance during 
off-peak hours since they have low marginal generating costs and can be dispatched 
economically during a large fraction of the hours of the year.   Joskow and Parsons (and MIT 
2003) report these calculations with different assumptions about future fuel prices and prices for 
CO2 emissions.  The life-cycle costs of alternative generating technologies under different 
assumptions about key operating cost variables can then be compared using a simple 
comparative “levelized cost per MWh” metric. 
 It should be recognized immediately that this is not the way that unregulated firms selling 
their output at market prices make investment choices.  They do not calculate levelized costs and 
choose the technology with the lowest number. To oversimplify, market-based investment 
decisions start with assumptions about future output prices, output quantities and associated 
operating costs, taxes, etc., from which a stream of expected future net cash flows is derived.  
This stream of future net cash flows is then discounted back to the present using a discount rate 
that reflects the firm’s cost of capital or hurdle rate.  If the present discounted value of future net 
cash flows exceeds the expected cost of the investment then the investment would be 
economically attractive.  If the present value of future cash flows is less than the cost of the 
investment then it is economically unattractive.  I will refer to this as a market-based evaluation 
mechanism. 
 Historically, the traditional market-based approach could not be applied in the regulated 
electric power industry because there was no well developed wholesale power market yielding 
                                                 
14 Updating portions of MIT (2003). 
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wholesale market prices that could profitably support investments in new merchant generating 
capacity.15  Indeed, just the opposite was the case.  Investment costs, fuel costs and other 
operating costs determined the prices consumers paid through the cost of service regulatory 
process.  Accordingly, “cost-based” investment evaluation protocols were a necessary feature of 
the regulatory process governing geographic electricity monopolies.   
 Of course, the world has now changed. There are now active wholesale markets in which 
a large number of merchant generators which must rely on market transactions, rather than cost 
of service regulation, to provide compensation for all of their costs participate. The wholesale 
market prices produced in these markets can, in principle, be used to evaluate investment 
alternatives.  Moreover, there are a few important hidden assumptions that lie behind the use of 
traditional levelized cost calculations to make comparisons between alternative conventional 
dispatchable generating technologies. Of particular importance is the implicit assumption that the 
generating plants being compared are all dispatchable and can be controlled by the system 
operator based on economic and reliability criteria.  Another related implicit assumption is that 
the production profiles --- the hours of the year that the generating plant will be available --- are 
very similar across the technologies.  For example “base load” investment candidates are 
typically compared with other “base load” candidates and not with peaking or intermediate load 
technologies.  If the production profiles are the same then the value of the electricity supplied 
will be the same and the technology with the lowest levelized cost will also have the highest net 
value and would be the most profitable choice in a market context.  
                                                 
15 Of course there have been wholesale power markets operating in the U.S. for several decades.  However, these 
markets were primarily markets for “economy energy” traded between existing generating units with different 
marginal generating costs.  These markets were essentially “excess energy” markets that could not provide revenues 
adequate to support the costs of investing in new generating capacity.  Instead these costs were recovered through 
the regulatory process. 
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 However, the usefulness of simple levelized cost “rule of thumb” comparisons breaks 
down when the generating technologies being considered have different dispatch capabilities, 
capital/output ratios, and production profiles. When comparisons are made between generation 
technologies which are dispatchable by the system operator based on real time economic and 
reliability considerations and “intermittent” generation whose output is based on exogenous 
factors like wind and insolation and do not reflect traditional scheduling, economic dispatch and 
network reliability considerations, the value of the output they are expected to produce must also 
be taken into account along with their respective life cycle costs. Looking only at levelized cost 
comparisons tells only part of the story.  Other things equal, the production profiles for 
intermittent and dispatchable generation and the value of the electricity they produce are likely to 
be very different, making comparisons based on levelized cost alone meaningless.  
 It is especially important to get more accurate measures of the economic value of 
intermittent technologies because many intermittent technologies benefit from direct subsidies 
(tax credits, renewable energy credits and loan guarantees) and indirect subsidies (renewable 
purchase mandates).  If these technologies are truly competitive with conventional dispatchable 
alternatives the subsidies are unnecessary.  If they are not, taxpayers and consumers should be 
aware of how much they are paying in hidden subsidies in an effort to force these technologies 
into the system.  Moreover, if the primary motivation for promoting renewable technologies is to 
reduce GHG emissions, it would be helpful to know how much relying on these technologies 
costs per ton of CO2e removed.   This would help policymakers to determine if subsidies and 
mandates for renewable energy technologies represent the least costly way to achieve GHG 
reduction goals. 
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SIMPLE NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
 Let us begin with an extremely simple characterization of an electric power system.  
There are two demand periods: peak and off-peak.  The peak period is 3000 hours per year and 
the off-peak period is 5760 hours per year.  The level of off-peak demand is 50% of the level of 
peak demand.  Demand is perfectly price inelastic and there is a large existing generating 
capacity portfolio that is almost perfectly adequate to meet demand and associated 
RTO/ISO/NERC reliability criteria.  There is a competitive wholesale market with peak period 
prices of $90/MWh and off-peak prices of $40/MWh.  I focus on a very small incremental 
investments (e.g. 1 MW) so we can safely hold market prices constant.  There are two 
technologies available for incremental investment. Their attributes are depicted in Table 1 and 
Table 2 along with the associated real levelized cost per MWh for each technology.  The 
attributes have been chosen so that the levelized costs of the intermittent and the dispatchable 
generating technology are virtually identical (the levelized cost of the intermittent generating 
technology is slightly lower).  
 The dispatchable technology has an annualized real capital cost (real rental cost) of 
$300,000/MW/Year and real marginal operating costs of $20/MWh (think nuclear).  Since 
market prices exceed the dispatchable generator’s marginal operating cost it will be dispatched 
whenever it is available.  I assume that the plant must be out of service 10% of the year for 
maintenance and refueling and that these outage hours are concentrated during the off-peak 
period.  Accordingly, the dispatchable plant runs 7884 (capacity factor of 90% = 7884/8760) 
hours during the year and runs during all 3000 peak hours.  The levelized cost is calculated as the 
annualized fixed cost of 1 MW of capacity divided by the number of MWh supplied 
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(7884MWh/MW of capacity) plus the operating cost per MWh to yield a $58.1/MWh real 
levelized cost. 
 The intermittent technology has an annualized capital cost (rental cost) of 
$150,000/MW/Year and a $0/MWh marginal operating cost (think wind).  The output of the 
plant varies with the exogenous variation in the resource that drives the generator; speed and 
direction of the wind, insolation, tidal movements, etc., depending on the technology. That is, the 
power is supplied when the wind blows or the sun shines so to speak, not based on the value of 
the electricity produced at different hours during the year.  The average capacity factor is 
assumed to be 30%.16  
 The levelized costs for these two technologies are approximately the same.  So, if we 
were to look only at the levelized cost calculations, the two technologies would appear to be 
“competitive.” Indeed, the intermittent technology appears to be slightly more “competitive” 
than the dispatchable technology from this perspective.  Note that the capacity factors of the 
dispatchable and intermittent technologies are quite different and the capacity factors have been 
incorporated directly into the calculation of the levelized costs. While the intermittent technology 
has a much lower capacity factor, the capital cost per unit of capacity is lower than the capital 
                                                 
16 Let me note a few things about the 30% capacity factor assumption.  A 30% capacity factor does not mean that in 
the real world generator runs at full capacity 30%  of the time and produce nothing 70% of the time.  The capacity 
factor is simply the actual generation divided by the maximum generation that would be supplied if the plant ran at 
full capacity during the entire year.  For example, a wind turbine typically has a lower bound wind speed where it 
does not run at all (e.g. 8 miles/hour) and an upper bound wind speed (e.g. 50 miles/hour) where it must be turned 
off to avoid damage (e.g. from a hurricane).  There is a range of wind speeds where the turbine will run at full 
capacity.  Below this “sweet spot,” output varies with the third power of the wind velocity.  That is, if wind speed 
doubles output will increase by a factor of eight.  During these hours the wind turbine is running at less than full 
capacity. The 30% capacity factor is a reasonable assumption for the average  wind turbine in operation in the U.S. 
(USDOE) and may be a little generous (Boccard).  Of course capacity factors for wind generation vary widely from 
location to location and from year to year at a specific location because of differences in the attributes of the wind.  
A typical photovoltaic facility has a much lower capacity factor (e.g. 15-20%) than a typical wind turbine and a 
much higher levelized cost.  However, since the sun shines during the day and electricity prices are higher during the 
day than at night, the value of the electricity produced by the solar technology may be higher than the value of the 
electricity produced by the wind technology.  
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cost per MW/Year for the dispatchable technology and the operating costs of the intermittent 
technology are assumed to be zero.   
 There are many arguments about the right capacity factors to use to calculate levelized 
costs, with proponents of each technology trying to drive down the estimated levelized cost by 
assuming higher capacity factors than are likely to be achieved in reality.17  The political game 
has been to assume that capacity factors are high in order to drive down the advertised levelized 
cost of a particular technology so that the technology appears to be more competitive than it 
actually is likely to be.18  Adopting better methods for comparing the economics of different 
generating technologies can help to improve the level of discourse about them. 
 Let’s  return to the numerical examples. As already noted, once a dispatchable generating 
plant with the attributes assumed here is completed, it will be economical for the dispatchable 
technology to produce electricity during all hours of the year when it is available since its 
marginal operating cost per unit of output is lower than the wholesale market price in all hours of 
the year.  Accordingly, it will be dispatched in all hours when it is available. Outages (e.g. for 
maintenance) do limit production to 7844 hours in this example, and I have assumed for 
simplicity that the outages are all taken during off-peak hours.  These assumptions will be 
maintained in all three examples.  The upper panels of tables 3A, 3B and 3C display the 
revenues, costs and profitability of an incremental 1 MW investment in the dispatchable 
technology.  The dispatchable technology earns enough revenue to cover all of its costs plus a 
small additional profit.   
 The intermittent technology, despite the fact that the marginal cost of generation is zero,   
cannot be dispatched based on traditional economic dispatch criteria and runs, in the case of 
                                                 
17 Boccard finds that actual realized capacity factors fall short of forecast capacity factors for wind generators. 
18 This observation applies to both renewable and conventional generating technologies. 
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wind, based on exogenous variations in wind speed and direction. Let us assume in Case 1 
(Table 3A) that it is windy at night (off-peak) but that the wind is too calm during the day (peak) 
to drive the turbine.  The intermittent generator then produces electricity only during off-peak 
periods and only for 2628 of the 5760 hours as limited by the wind resource that drives the 
turbine.  This is an extreme assumption, but for a two period model it is not inconsistent with the 
performance of wind generation in California (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).19  The revenues, costs 
and profitability of 1MW of “off-peak” wind generation is given in the second panel of Table 
3A.  The wind generating technology with these attributes does not cover its costs and exhibits a 
large negative profit. Thus, despite having the same levelized cost as the dispatchable 
generating technology, the economic value of the electricity supplied by 1 MW of these two 
technologies is quite different.  The value of the electricity supplied by a unit of dispatchable 
generating technology is over 4 times higher than that for the intermittent generation technology.  
This is reflected as well in the profitability of the two generating technologies.  A wind generator 
with these attributes would surely require a large subsidy or selected in response to a renewable 
electricity purchase mandate since it is uneconomical.20 
 Let us look at a second example with a different set of assumptions. See Table 3B. The 
intermittent generator is now assumed to run for 50 hours during the peak period (a 17% capacity 
factor during peak hours) and for 2578 hours during the off-peak period (a 45% capacity factor 
                                                 
19 While the situation in California is extreme, wind generation is negatively correlated with peak demand in many 
other areas of  North America including Texas, New York, and Ontario.  In New York, capacity factors are much 
higher during winter months than during the peak summer months.  The capacity factor for wind generated in New 
York during the peak summer hours of 2PM to 6PM was 22.9% in 2007, 16.7% in 2008, and 14.1% in 2009 
(NYISO, page 95). 
20 Placing a price on CO2 might change this conclusion but this could only be determined by adding assumptions 
about emissions and CO2 prices.  If the dispatchable technology is nuclear then CO2 pricing would actually make the 
dispatchable technology more attractive since it would displace more existing fossil generation per MW of capacity. 
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during off-peak hours).21  The attributes of the dispatchable technology are assumed to be the 
same, and the value of the electricity produced and the associated total costs are the same as in 
the first example as well.  The second panel of Table 3B displays the revenues, costs and 
profitability for the intermittent technology.  Shifting some output to the peak period increases 
revenues, but not by enough to cover the intermittent generator’s total costs and investment in 
the intermittent technology (absent subsidies) still yields a negative profit 
 Again the intermittent technology produces electricity with a lower value than the 
dispatchable technology and the revenue that would be earned if it sold its output at market 
prices does not cover its costs.  One MW of the intermittent technology has a much lower social 
value than does one MW of the dispatchable technology despite the fact that their levelized costs 
are almost identical.  The reason is that the intermittent technology produces a larger fraction of 
its (limited) output during low electricity price hours.  
 For the third example we will make an extreme assumption about the output profile of the 
intermittent technology.  See Table 3C. Let’s assume that the intermittent technology fortuitously 
produces all of its electricity during the peak period.  This would be more plausible for a solar 
technology than for wind, though solar technologies still do exhibit intermittency. Solar thermal 
plants have much more attractive production profiles (Figure 4 --- parabolic trough technology) 
since the sun shines during the day when demand is high, though cloud cover can both reduce the 
level of peak output during the day and make it more volatile (Figure 5).  Similarly for 
photovoltaic technology output varies with insolation (Figure 6 and Figure 7).  So, solar 
technology may have a higher levelized cost than wind technology, but it may produce much 
more valuable electricity.  Levelized cost calculations hide this important factor.   
                                                 
21 This is roughly equal to the peak period capacity factors for wind generators in New York, though the off-peak 
capacity factors in New York State appear to be closer to 30% than 45% (NYISO, page 95). 
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The intermittent technology now has a peak period capacity factor of 87%, limited only 
by the availabilty of the wind or insolation to drive the turbine.  The dispatchable generator will 
operate as before and produce electricity with the same dispatch characteristics, output profile, 
market value and cost.  The revenues, costs, and profitability of the intermittent generator are 
displayed in the second panel of Table 3C. In this case, if the electricity it produces were sold at 
market prices the intermittent generating technology would cover its costs and earn a substantial 
profit.  Indeed, it would be substantially more profitable than the dispatchable technology 
characterized so far.  It would also be profitable for the intermittent technology to enter the 
market without subsidies. 
 The key message from these examples is that when the electricity is produced by an 
intermittent generating technology, the level of output and the value of the electricity at the times 
when the output is produced are key variables that should be taken into account in comparing 
intermittent technologies with dispatchable technologies and intermittent technologies with each 
other.  Since wholesale electricity prices also vary by location, the location of the output and 
associated locational prices should also be taken into account, as would be the case for 
dispatchable generating technologies as well.   
 
AN ALTERNATIVE COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 It should be clear that using traditional levelized cost calculations to compare 
dispatchable and intermittent generating technologies or to compare different intermittent 
technologies is a meaningless exercise and can lead to inaccurate valuations of alternative 
generating technologies.  While levelized cost calculations may be a simple way accurately to 
compare different dispatchable base load generating technologies with different capital and 
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operating cost attributes (Joskow and Parsons (2009)), it is not a useful way to compare 
generating technologies with very different production profiles and associated differences in the 
market value of the electricity they produce. When these kinds of comparisons are at issue, as 
they now frequently are given the public policy and regulatory pressures to increase investment 
in renewable energy technologies with intermittent output characteristics, a different set of 
methods is required to better understand what the true costs are for different generation 
technologies.   
 A good starting point would be to evaluate all generating technologies, both intermittent 
and dispatchable, based on the expected market value of the electricity that they will supply, 
their total life-cycle costs and their associated expected profitability, rather than focusing only on 
the levelized cost per unit of output.  Such an analysis would reflect the actual expected 
production profiles of dispatchable and intermittent technologies, the value of electricity supplied 
at different times, and other costs of intermittency associated with reliable network integration. 
That is, abandon levelized cost comparisons and adopt more standard economic evaluation 
methods for new generating capacity.  This kind of analysis can be performed with and without 
direct subsidies, mandates, renewable credits, etc., so that the true costs of alternative 
technologies can be identified, the costs of the direct and indirect subsidies can be made 
transparent, and the cost per unit of CO2 displaced by different technologies can be easily 
measured. 
 This framework can be used as well to design better competitive procurement systems 
and can be employed to shed more light on other issues that have been associated with the 
growing reliance on intermittent generation.   Indeed, many system operators are already using 
this framework to identify technical issues with large scale deployment of intermittent generation 
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and to measure the costs networks are likely to incur to respond to intermittency in order to 
maintain reliability criteria (e.g. ERCOT).  The framework can also be used properly to measure 
the costs of the renewable electricity promotion policies that have been adopted by state and 
federal governments and in this way increase the transparency of these costs to the public.  It also 
provides a useful framework for quantifying the value of adding storage capabilities to 
intermittent technologies and for designing competitive procurement programs for renewable 
energy that properly take account of differences in production profiles and the associated value 
of the electricity produced from plants at locations with different wind and solar resources.   
 Finally, this approach will increase transparency about the costs of alternative generating 
technologies, the costs of subsidies provided to certain technologies, other costs of intermittency, 
and the environmental benefits of promoting technologies with subsidies, credits, and mandates 
that would not otherwise be economical choices.  The increased transparency will improve 
public policy decisions and illuminate inaccuracies about costs and competitiveness advanced by 
interest groups promoting particular generation technologies to feather their own nests. 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
 This type of market based or electric power “systems” approach can help to illuminate 
other issues associated with the introduction of large amounts of intermittent generating capacity 
into electric power systems. 
  a. Renewable Electricity Procurement:  Many states with renewable electricity 
mandates require distribution utilities to run competitive solicitations to ensure that they meet 
their renewable energy procurement obligation with the “least costly” renewable technologies.  
The previous discussion should make it clear that the wrong way to organize a procurement 
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auction for intermittent generating capacity would be to select the suppliers that offer the lowest 
price per MWh supplied without regard to the hours when the electricity is expected to be 
supplied and the associated market prices for this electricity.  As before, the net economic value 
of competing projects with the same costs can vary widely depending on their production 
profiles and the value of the electricity that they supply when the wind blows or the sun shines.  
Paying less for a project that only supplies off peak power could be a very inefficient choice if a 
more costly alternative with a more economically attractive output profile is available.   
 There is a simple conceptual way to change the structure of procurement auctions for 
intermittent generation to remedy this problem.  Rather than running an auction to supply 
renewable energy per se, the auction should be based on the subsidy that will be paid to qualified 
renewable generators to supply energy when it is available.  Suppliers interested in participating 
in the auction would bid the subsidy that they are willing to accept for a specified level of output 
if they are chosen to receive a contract through the auction.  The subsidies per MWh supplied bid 
into the auction by different project are ordered from lowest to highest.  The procurement auction 
then selects the projects with the lowest subsidy bids that in the aggregate meet the procurement 
quantity target. The subsidy bid by the marginal bidder that just misses being selected then 
determines the subsidy per MWh supplied that each of the winning bidders will receive.  The 
renewable generators are then free to make their own commercial arrangements to sell the power 
they produce itself and will reflect the revenue they expect to receive from sales of their output 
into the market in their bids.22 The generators that can supply power when it is most valuable 
will then require a smaller subsidy than those who will supply power when it is less valuable, 
other things equal.  A procurement system that separates the commercial arrangements for 
                                                 
22 Of course, whether and how they will do so depends on many other attributes of a renewable energy procurement 
auction. 
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supplying the power from the contractual arrangements to provide subsidies for what the 
renewable generators actually produce will lead to more efficient choices of suppliers than a 
naïve “least cost” auction that ignores differences in production profiles and the wide differences 
in the value of electricity at different times. 
 b. Storage:  If we compare Table 3A with Table 3C we see immediately that storage 
capacity would be very valuable in locations where the renewable resource has the attribute that 
it drives the generator mostly off-peak.  At the extreme, if storage could shift all of the 
generation from an intermittent generator from the off-peak period to the peak period, the value 
of the electricity supplied would increase by a factor of four in the example.  However, if 
procurement programs do not incorporate the value of electricity produced at different times, 
renewable generators will have no incentive to add storage capacity to their projects. 
 c. Consistency with Analyses of Grid Integration Issues:  The approach taken here is 
completely consistent with ongoing analyses of operational issues associated with large scale 
scale integration of intermittent technologies into electric power networks, the associated 
incremental costs, and implications for pricing network reliability services (e.g. frequency 
regulation and spinning reserves), redispatch costs, output constraints resulting from 
transmission constraints (including those placed on wind), and capacity values (e.g. based on the 
expected capacity factor during the few highest peak hours of the year rather than nominal 
capacity or average capacity factors).  The analyses of these issues requires a systems approach 
that carefully takes into account output profiles, required response speeds to match supply and 
demand in real time, accuracy of day-ahead forecasting of output, etc.  The analyses of these 
issues performed by ERCOT is an excellent example of how this kind of study can be done.  The 
tools used by ERCOT to examine these operational issues can easily be applied as well to 
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evaluate the more basic questions about the economics of investing in alternative generating 
technologies discussed here. 
  d. Production Tax Credits:  Qualifying renewable generating units now receive a 
production tax credit of 2.1 cents/KWh (indexed to inflation) from the federal government.  This 
tax credit is earned regardless of the time the electricity is actually produced or its economic 
value.  This is an inefficient way to subsidize renewable energy because it does not provide 
incentives for intermittent generators to choose locations, schedule maintenance, etc. in a way 
that maximizes the value of the electricity produced.  A tax credit that is high for supplies 
provided during peak hours and low for supplies provided during off-peak hours would provide 
better incentives and increase the net economic value of renewable energy investments. 
 e. Other Incentive Issues:  It is clear from the comprehensive studies examining economic 
and reliability issues resulting from large scale expansion of intermittent generation (e.g. 
NYISO, ERCOT, NERC) that its reliable integration into electric power networks will increase 
costs related to frequency regulation, spinning reserves, transmission congestion and investment, 
redispatch, and backup capacity costs.  The magnitude of these costs will no doubt continue to be 
debated.  However, it is essential that these additional costs get factored into prices charged to 
intermittent generators for grid reliability services, redispatch and backup capacity to provide 
appropriate incentives for more efficient investment in intermittent technologies.  Our ability to 
use proper prices incentives to efficiently guide investment decision, including the location, type, 
and capacity of intermittent generation entering the market is unfortunately limited by 
quantitative mandates to purchase minimum quantities of intermittent generation regardless of 
their economic merits.  Relying instead on pricing CO2 emissions combined with proper pricing 
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of grid services and backup capacity (through proper capacity payment mechanisms) would yield 
superior economic and environmental outcomes. 
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TABLE 1 
HYPOTHETICAL LEVELIZED COSTS COMPARISON 
 
 
 
     Base Load    Intermittent 
 
 
Construction + Fixed O&M Cost  $300,000/MW/Year  $150,000/MW/Year 
(levelized/MW/year) 
 
Operating Cost   20.0¢/KWh    0¢/KWh 
(levelized/MWh) 
 
Capacity Factor   90%     30% 
 
MWh/MW/year   7884     2628 
 
Levelized cost/MWh   $58.1/MWh    $57.1/MWh  
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TABLE 2 
 
HYPOPTHETICAL PEAK AND OFF-PEAK ATTRIBUTES 
 
 
Peak period:  
 Hours:   3000 
 
 Price (levelized):    $90/MWh 
 
Off-peak period: 
 
 Hours:   5760 
 
 Price (levelized):    $40/MWh 
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TABLE 3A 
 
HYPOTHETICAL VALUATIONS OF INTERMITTENT AND DISPATCHABLE 
GENERATION WITH THE SAME LEVELIZED COST 
 
CASE 1 
 
Dispatchable MWh supply: 
 Peak:   3000 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  4884 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $465,360/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $457,680/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $7,680/MW/year 
 
Intermittent MWh supply: 
 
 Peak:   0 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  2628 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $105,120/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $150,000/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   -$44,880 
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TABLE 3B 
 
HYPOTHETICAL VALUATIONS OF INTERMITTENT AND DISPATCHABLE 
GENERATION WITH THE SAME LEVELIZED COST 
 
CASE 2 
 
Dispatchable MWh supply: 
 Peak:   3000 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  4884 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $465,360/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $457,680/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $7,680/MW/year 
 
Intermittent MWh supply: 
 
 Peak:   50 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  2578 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $107,620/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $150,000/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   -$42,380/MW/year 
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TABLE 3C 
 
HYPOTHETICAL VALUATIONS OF INTERMITTENT AND DISPATCHABLE 
GENERATION WITH THE SAME LEVELIZED COST 
 
CASE 3 
 
Dispatchable MWh supply: 
 Peak:   3000 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  4884 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $465,360/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $457,680/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $7,680/MW/year 
 
Intermittent MWh supply: 
 
 Peak:   2628 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:       0   MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $236,520/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $150,000/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $  86,520/MW/year 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Top 5% of Real Time Energy (only) Prices in the PJM RTO23 
 
 
 
 
 
State of the Market Report for PJM 2009, Monitoring Analytics, LLC (Independent Market 
Monitor for PJM), Volume 2, page 64, March 11, 2016  
  
                                                 
23 Note that this excludes capacity payments and payments for ancillary services. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Source: NERC (2009), p.16 
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FIGURE 3 
CALIFORNIA WIND GENERATION DURING 2006 HEAT WAVE 
 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 37. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
             Source: NERC (2009), page 26. 
FIGURE 5 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 26 
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FIGURE 6 
 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 28 
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FIGURE 7 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 28 
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FIGURE 8 
 
As printed in The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2010, page R4. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703846604575447762301637550.html# 
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